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1. Introduction 
Automation is “the application of machines to tasks once performed by human beings, or 
increasingly, to tasks that would otherwise be impossible”, Encyclopaedia Britannica [1]. 
The term automation itself was coined in the 1940s at the Ford Motor Company. The idea of 
automating processes and systems started many years earlier than this as part of the 
agricultural and industrial revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. There is little 
disputing that England was a major contributor to the Industrial Revolution and indeed was 
the birth place of some prominent inventors, for example. in the area of textiles: 
 James Hargreaves: Spinning Jenny 
 Sir Richard Arkwright: Mechanical Spinning Machine 
 Edmund Cartwright: Power Loom 
Cartwright’s power loom was powered by a steam engine. At these early stages we see the 
symbiotic relationships between automation, energy and power. The early forms of 
automation can only largely be described as mechanisation, but the emergence of electrical 
power systems in the late 19th century and the entry of electronic valves in the early 20th 
century heralded the humble beginnings of modern automation. With electronic valves 
came computers. One of the earliest computers was the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Automatic Computer) built over two years between 1943 and 1946. It 
occupied an area of 1000 square feet (about 93 square metres), had 18000 valves and 
consumed 230 kW [2]. 
Before the deployment of computers in industrial automation, relays and RELAY LOGIC, 
the wiring of circuits with relays to achieve automation tasks, was in common use. Today, 
however, relay logic is far less used than computer-based, PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC, 
which has followed the invention of the transistor, integrated circuits and microprocessors. 
2. Automation in the automobile (car / truck) industry 
The motor assembly line pioneered by Ransom Olds and Henry Ford, the maturity of 
computer technology and the structured nature of the car assembly process led early 
entrepreneurs in the motor industry to view automation as key to business success. Indeed 
there was all to be gained in automation and today automation is viewed to have, among 
many other attributes, the following [3]: 
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a. relieves humans from monotony and drudgery 
b. relieves humans from arduous and dangerous tasks 
c. increases productivity and speeds up work rates 
d. improves product quality 
e. reduces costs and prices 
f. increases energy and material savings 
g. improves safety 
h. provides better data capture and product tracking. 
The automotive industry was very competitive right from the early days and automation 
soon came to be seen as key to commercial success. General Motors embraced it and so did 
many other auto manufacturing corporations in the US, Europe and Japan. The computer 
system used was designed for the usually harsh industrial environments. Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC) as such computers are known typically to have many inputs and 
outputs; the inputs receiving sensor signals, the outputs being for displaying information or 
driving actuators (Figure 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1. 
The need for standardization was realized early, especially when many PLCs are required to 
achieve the automation task. The standards generating body IEEE has been a driving force 
in computer communication standards over the years. One of its standards, the token ring 
802.4 was implemented in modified form by General Motors in its Manufacturing 
Automation Protocol (MAP). 
3. Power system automation 
The early power plants had a modest number of sensor and action variables, of the order of 
several hundreds. Modern large power stations have in excess of hundreds of thousands, 
even tens of million variables [3]. It is therefore easy to see that automation took root in 
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power and generating stations earlier than in transmission and distribution. One of the 
useful applications of automation is in the railway industry where remote control of power 
is often vital. This manifests itself in systems to control and manage power supplies to 
electric locomotives. The deprivation of power to any locomotives in a section could 
seriously disrupt schedules, inconvenience customers and in the end have serious adverse 
financial implications. Consider Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. 
In earlier systems, the “mini computer” would have been sourced from specialised 
computer companies such as IBM, Perkin Elmer, Digital Equipment Corporation. The 
operating systems would have belonged to the same equipment provider (e.g., VMS VAX, 
in the case of Digital Equipment Corporation). The microwave link would have been part of 
the infrastructure costs for the project. The synoptic panel, allowed visual representation of 
the system states to the operator (and also some capabilities for remote switching). For 
Figure 1, the operator at the control centre is able switch a circuit breaker ON or OFF 
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through the microwave link. Interface cards (IC) provide the necessary I/O capabilities. The 
remote terminal unit (RTU) is able to send a switching signal to the circuit breaker through a 
suitably designed actuator. The circuit breaker is also able to send its position (ON or OFF) 
through the RTU and the same microwave link to the operator’s panel. The older type of 
hardwired panel is largely being replaced by electronic displays and the controller is able to 
receive and view system status through touch panel capabilities or through networked 
computers in the control room. 
The proprietary nature of the old “legacy systems meant that embarking on the path to 
automation was not a trivial matter. The cost of ownership, (infrastructure, hardware and 
software costs) was very high. Also very high were the costs of maintaining and upgrading 
this hardware and software. The cost of software licences was often prohibitive. On the 
other hand cyber threats and virus attacks were unheard of. The systems themselves were 
broadly secure, but not necessarily reliable. Communication link (microwave failure) meant 
that there was at the time, as there is even in this generation, a need for “manual back-ups”. 
This usually meant sending a technician to do manual switching operations. 
4. Modern grid and substation automation 
Power system automation happens in segments of the power system (Northcote-Green, 
Wilson) [4] which can serve different functions. One segment is bulk transmission of power 
which traditionally was handled by the power producer, but increasingly (in de-regulated 
environments), is handled by an independent transmission system operator (TSO). Bulk 
transmission is usually associated with outdoor switchyards and high voltage operating 
voltage levels (in excess of 132 kV). Bulk transmission substations play a critical role in 
energy trading and power exchanges. Wholesale electricity is sold through the transmission 
system to distributors. Figure 3 shows a portion of the 400 kV outdoor substation at AUAS 
near Windhoek, the capital of Namibia. Namibia is a net importer of electrical power most 
of it from neighbouring South Africa and this substation is of vital importance. The 
substation with which it connects in South Africa is over 800 km away at Aries near 
Kenhardt. Figure 4 shows the Namibian electrical power transmission network. The 
complex interconnections between equipment, such as transformers, reactors, lines and bus-
bars, is such that manual operation is not a practical proposition. In the case of the AUAS 
substation, effective control is in the hands of Namibia Power Corporation’s (Nampower) 
headquarter-based National Control Centre in Windhoek. 
The other segment of automation is at distribution level. Large distributors are typically 
municipal undertakings or in countries in which electrical power is de-regulated, the so 
called “DISCOS”. Automation has existed at the distribution level for many years, but has 
been restricted to situations involving either large numbers of customers or critical loads. As 
a result of this the quality of service given has been very good, while the rural consumers 
have been at a disadvantage. For power distributors, automating rural supplies was not 
cost-effective due to the dispersed nature of the lines and loads (Alsthom Network 
Protection and Application Guide) [5]. Technology changes in recent years, national power 
quality directives as well as increased consciousness by consumers themselves has led to 
radical changes in our Power System Control infrastructure and ways of operation with 
serious implications for those organisations that lag behind [NPAG]. 
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Fig. 3. A group of Polytechnic of Namibia students visit the AUAS 400 kV substation 
4.1 Distribution systems automation 
From experience, faults at transmission levels are less frequent than at distribution levels 
[6]. At the same time distribution networks are not only complex, but the consequences of 
failure are quite severe. For this reason investment in distribution automation will increase. 
The elements that characterise distribution automation systems are given the definition by 
the IEEE. According to the IEEE, a Distribution Automation System (DAS) is “a system that 
enables an electric utility to remotely monitor, coordinate and operate distribution 
components, in a real-time mode from remote locations [7]”. In this chapter we shall deal in 
more detail with the components involved and how they are coordinated within a DAS. In 
countries or situations where there are large networks, the network (primary distribution) 
itself is subdivided into more segments, namely, one for large consumers (no 
transformation provided) and for the rest at a lower HV voltage (secondary distribution) 
(Figure 6). 
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Fig. 4. (courtesy AREVA, NPAG) 
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Fig. 5. (courtesy, Namibian Power Corporation) 
 
Fig. 6. (courtesy AREVA, NPAG) 
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5. Power system automation components 
Power system automation components may be classified according to their function: 
 Sensors 
 Interface Equipment 
 Controllers 
 Actuators 
Thus we see that Figure 1 is still a good representation of what is needed to effect 
automation, whether it is for EHV transmission, sub-transmission or distribution. Figure 7 
depicts the control philosophy of a power system automation scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. 
5.1 Overview of power system components 
5.1.1 Sensors 
5.1.1.1 Current and voltage transformers 
Individually or in combination current and voltage transformers (also called instrument 
transformers) are used in protective schemes such as overcurrent, distance and carrier 
protection. Also in combination current and voltage transformers are also used for power 
measurements. In general custom specified voltage and current transformers are used for 
power metering, because of the increased accuracy requirements. Figure 8 shows instrument 
transformers in one of the substation areas (called bays). 
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Fig. 8. 
5.1.1.2 Other sensors 
For reliable electrical power system performance the states, stress conditions and the 
environmental conditions associated with the components have to be monitored. A very 
costly component in a substation is a transformer. For a transformer, monitoring is done, for 
example, for pressure inside the tank, winding temperature and oil level. For circuit 
breakers, sensing signals may need to be obtained from it such as gas pressure and number 
of operations. 
5.1.2 Switches, isolators, circuit breakers 
A most important function of a substation is the enabling of circuit configuration changes 
occasioned by, for example, planned maintenance, faults feeders or other electrical 
equipment. This function is of course in addition to the other important function of circuit 
protection which may also necessitate configuration changes. Modern switches and circuit 
breakers will have contacts or sensors to indicate their state or position. Figure 9 shows the 
ABB HH circuit breaker mechanism. The plant required to achieve the desired operation is 
usually quite elaborate and includes controls and protection to ensure that it operates 
reliably. 
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Fig. 9. Portion of HH ABB circuit breaker mechanism 
6. IEC 61850 substation automation: Origin and philosophy 
The International Electrotechnical Commission is one of the most recognisable standard 
generating bodies for the electrical power industry. Its standard the IEC 61850 
“Communication Networks and Systems in Substations” is a global standard governing 
communications in substations. The scope of the standards is very broad and its 
ramifications very profound. So profound in fact that it is hard to imagine any new modern 
substation that would not at least incorporate parts of this standard. In addition, the 
standard is almost sure to be adopted albeit in customised / modified form in Generation, 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and in manufacturing. The standard has its origins in 
the Utility Communications Architecture (UCA), a 1988 initiative by the Electrical Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) and IEEE with the initial aim of achieving inter-operability 
between control centres and between substations and control centres. In the end it was 
found to be more prudent to join efforts with similar work being done by the Working 
Group 10 of Number 57 (TC57). The emerged document IEC 61850 used work already done 
by the UCA as a basis for further development. 
6.1 IEC 61850 substation architecture 
6.1.1 Substation bays 
In an IEC 61850 compliant substation, equipment is organized into areas or zones called 
bays. In these areas we find switching devices (e.g., isolators and circuit breakers) that 
connect, for example, lines or transformers to bus-bars. 
 Power System and Substation Automation 113 
Examples of the bays would be: 
 Incomer bay 
 Bus-coupler bay 
 Transformer bay 
Figure 8 above, for example, could depict a transformer bay. 
6.1.2 Merging units 
Merging units are signal conditioners and processors. For example, they accept, merge and 
synchronise sampled current and voltage signals (all three phases’ quantities of the CT/VT) 
from current and voltage transformers (conventional and non-conventional) and then 
transfer them to intelligent electronic devices (see IEDs, in the next section). So called 
electronic VTs and CTs are being manufactured by some companies which use new ways of 
sensing with the overall size being reduced. With electronic sensing, the sensing and 
merging are combined. Figure 10 gives an overview of the functions and associated inputs 
of a merging unit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. (Jansen & Apostolov) 
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As technology progresses it is believed that there will be a move away from copper 
connections from field devices to the substation control room in favour of fibre. Figure 11 
shows a merging unit (Brick) by vendor GE. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
An IED is any substation device which has a communications port to electronically transfer 
analog, status or control data via a proprietary or standard transmission format (BPL Global 
IEC 61850 Guide) [8]. Examples of IEDs are: 
 Modern IEC 61850 protection relays (distance, over-current, etc.) 
 Equipment-specific IED (e.g., for transformer bay protection and control, with tripping 
logic, disturbance monitoring, voltage, current, real and reactive power, energy, 
frequency, etc.). 
 Bay controllers 
Figure 11 shows some IEDs from various vendors with multiple functionality. 
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Fig. 11. 
In reality today’s IEDs have “mutated” to the form of programmable logical controllers 
(PLCs) of another kind with multiple capabilities. 
6.1.4 Device/system integration: Substation functional hierarchy 
An IEC 61850-designed substation has the following hierarchical zones: 
 Process 
 Bay 
 Station 
Diagrammatically this is illustrated in Figure 12 (Jansen & Apostolov) [9]. A complete 
representation that includes aspects, such as links to remote control centres and GIS, is given 
in Figure 13. 
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Fig. 12. 
 
Fig. 13. (courtesy SISCO & GE) 
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Fig. 14. Fibre-based 
 
Fig. 15. 
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7. Substation communications and protocols 
With the IEC 61850 technology and with all the components and systems described in 
previous sections functioning normally, we have in fact a virtual substation. The remote 
terminal units (RTU) increasingly with IED functionality, pass on analog and digital data 
through either copper or fibre to IEDs in the substation control room in the form of relays or 
bay controllers. The process of transferring data and communicating it to various devices 
has been greatly simplified with the aid of the standard. The data arriving at the IEDs comes 
already formatted / standardized. The situation is similar to the “plug and play” 
philosophy applied to computer peripherals of today. 
7.1 Virtualisation 
With the IEC 61850 a real substation is transformed into a virtual substation, i.e., real devices 
transformed into objects with unique standardized codes. In Figure 16, a real device, a 
transformer bay is transformed into a virtual, logical device with descriptive name, e.g., 
Relay1. Inside the device are logical nodes (LN) named strictly in accordance with the IEC 
standard. For example, a circuit breaker inside this logical device is given XCBR1 [10]. In turn 
the breaker has other objects associated with it, e.g., status (open / closed) and health. The 
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services associated with this data model are defined in the Abstract Communications System 
Interface (ACSI). The following ACSI functions are listed by Karlheinz Schwartz [11]: 
 Logical Nodes are used as containers of any information (data objects) to be monitored 
 Data objects are used to designate useful information to be monitored 
 Retrieval (polling) of the values of data objects (GetDataObjectValues) 
 Send events from a server device to a client (spontaneous reporting) 
 Store historical values of data objects (logging) 
 Exchange sampled values (current, voltages and vibration values) 
 Exchange simple status information (GOOSE) 
 Recording functions with COMTRADE files as output 
7.2 Mapping 
IEC 61850 is a communications standard, a main aim of which is interoperability. A good 
definition is: 
“Interoperability is the ability of two or more IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) from 
the same vendor, or different vendors to exchange information and uses that information 
for correct co-operation” [12]. Although ACSI models enable all IEDs to behave 
identically from a general network behaviour perspective, they still need to be made to 
work with practical networks in the power industry, (Baigent, Adamiak and Mackiewicz) 
[10]. This universal compatibility is achieved through mapping of the abstract services to 
universal, industry-recognised protocols. Presently the protocol most supported is the 
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS). MMS was chosen because it has an 
established track record in industrial automation and can support the complex and 
service models of IEC 61850. 
Table 1 gives an idea of the naming process: 
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Fig. 16. Karlheinz Schwartz 
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8. Communication of events in an IEC 61850 substation 
In his IEC 61850 Primer, Herrera states that “IEC 61850 provides a standardized framework 
for substation integration that specifies the communications requirements, the functional 
characteristics, the structure of data in devices, the naming conventions for the data, how 
applications interact and control the devices, and how conformity to the standard should be 
tested. In simpler terms, IEC 61850 it is an open standard protocol created to facilitate 
communications in electric substations.” 
8.1 The communication structure of the substation 
The IEC 61850 architecture there are two busses: 
 Process bus 
 Station bus 
IEC 61850 station bus interconnects all bays with the station supervisory level and carries 
control information such as measurement, interlocking and operations [13]. 
IEC 61850 process bus interconnects the IEDs within a bay that carries real-time 
measurements for protection called sampled values or sampled measured values [13]. 
Figure 17 shows the basic architecture. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. 
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The process bus is designed to be fast since it must carry crucial I/O between IEDs and 
sensors/actuators. 
The requirements for the process bus cited in various literature sources are as follows: 
 High environmental requirements for the terminal equipment (electromagnetic 
compatibility, temperature, shock, where applicable) in the area of the primary system 
 Adequate bandwidth for several SV data streams  
 Highly prioritized trip signals for transmitting from the protection device to the  
CBC 
 Permeability of data to the station bus/data filtering at the coupling point 
 Simultaneous TCP/IP traffic for normal control and status signal traffic as well as 
reports on the process bus 
 Download/upload channel for setting or parameterizing functions 
 Highly precise time synchronization 
 Redundancy 
 For reasons of speed, the process bus is based on optical fibre with high data 
throughput of about 10Gbits/s. Because of its enhanced data capacity it is capable of 
carrying both GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) and SMV (Sampled 
Measured Values). The station bus is used for inter-IED communications. Only GOOSE 
messaging occurs in the station bus. 
9. Substation control and configuration 
Although the strengths of the IEC 61850 in the capturing, virtualisation, mapping and 
communication of substation information are undoubted, it will still be necessary to link 
everything together and to design a control strategy. This strategy must utilize the 
experience and expertise of the asset owner. The substation must also respond in accordance 
with the operational and safety criteria set by the organization. 
9.1 Substation configuration 
Automation of the substation will require in the first instance the capture of its 
configuration. This requires the capture of the information on all the IEDs in the substation. 
In some cases the IEDs could be from different vendors. The information has to be in a 
standardized IED Capability Description (ICD). Then, using a system configuration tool, a 
substation description file is created (Figure 18). The SCD (Substation Configuration 
Description) is then used by relay vendors to configure individual relays [14]. 
10. Wider implications of the IEC 61850: The Smart Grid 
“Smart Grid” is a term used to describe the information driven power systems of the future. 
This will involve introducing new electronic, information and computer technology into the 
whole value chain of electrical energy systems from generation, transmission and 
distribution down to the consumer level. Figure 19 shows the linkages between the 
technology of electricity production and commerce. 
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Fig. 18. 
 
 
 
Fig. 19. Source NIST Smart Grid Framework 
We have seen that automation started on the factory floor and some of the IEC 61850 
functions use manufacturing protocols such as MMS. We already start to see the trend 
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towards extending the IEC 61850 to generating stations. It is therefore not hard to 
imagine IEC 61850 like protocols encompassing every facet of engineering, including 
manufacture. 
10.1 Smart Grid benefits 
Among the benefits of Smart Grid are: 
 Increased grid efficiency - the use of control systems to achieve optimum power flow 
through, for example, centrally controlled FACTS devices which can increase efficiency 
of the transmission system 
 Better demand control - a Smart Grid would incorporate an energy management system 
to manage demand (e.g., managing the peaks and valleys) 
 Asset optimization - the IEC 61850 information model already has the capability to store 
not only the status of a logical device / node, but also condition / health  
 Management of renewable energy sources - renewable energy sources, such as wind 
and solar, tend to be unpredictable, therefore, the Smart Grid system can enable 
predictions on the availability of these resources at any moment and ensure proper 
energy scheduling decisions are taken 
 Management of plug in electric vehicles - the Smart Grid can inform electric vehicle 
motorists of the nearest charging stations 
 Smart metering - with smart metering, power usage and tariffs can be administered 
remotely to the advantage of both the supplier and the consumer 
11. Security threats in automated power systems 
In this chapter we have seen the central role computer hardware and software in the control 
and management of the power system bring tremendous benefits. However, investing in 
these high technology, information technology reliant assets also brings threats. The threats 
are quite serious especially when it is realized that every critical component of the 
substation becomes a virtual computer. The IED mentioned numerous times in this chapter 
is itself a computer. What are the threats? 
11.1 SCADA vulnerabilities Chikuni, Dondo [15] 
 Computing vulnerabilities 
Hardware: RTUs, IEDs and SCADA Masters belong to the class of computer hardware and 
suffer from the same vulnerabilities of regular computer systems such as interruption 
(denial of services [DoS]) and eavesdropping 
Communication links: the vulnerabilities are also similar to those in regular computer 
networks - if messages are not encrypted, data or passwords can be intercepted. Radiation 
emissions from equipment can be read by unauthorized people 
 SCADA software: the most common attacks come in the form of interruption, 
interception and modification. Software bugs, if not fixed in time, can attract hobbyist 
hackers to attack unpatched SCADA [15] 
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 Data: SCADA data has more value to the attacker than hardware and software. Data may be 
stolen by competitors of saboteurs. To safe guard the data, encryption needs to be included 
11.2 Other vulnerabilities 
 Equipment location: we have seen that some IEDs and RTUs are located in usually 
unmanned remote locations; where this applies these must be housed or mounted securely 
 Remote access: access to relays, controllers, IEDs and RTUs should be password 
protected; encryption modems are available for secure dial-up communications 
 Human element: the employee could be the most vulnerable part of the automated 
power system, therefore, no unauthorized persons should have access to the control 
terminals. Strong authentication and smart card access are recommended 
 Integrity and confidentiality: software and hardware should have at least the US 
National Computer Security Centre (NCSC) class 2 rating. In Europe criteria similar to 
that of NCSC is managed through the European Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) 
11.3 Attack examples 
Nadel et al. [16] list what they describe as generic attack categories to which all network-
based threats to substation automation systems can be reduced, namely: 
 Message modification 
 Message injection 
 Message suppression 
They demonstrate the various paths that an attacker can take in a given attack. An example 
of circuit breaker attack scenario is shown in Figure 20. In this case an attacker may take one 
of the paths in the graph to prevent a circuit breaker from opening when it is supposed to. 
11.4 Countermeasures 
Nadel et al. [16] list some of the important assumptions / precautions necessary before any 
meaningful countermeasures can be instituted. These include static configuration of the SAS 
and the number and types of devices in the bay level are known; configuration changes only 
to occur during major maintenance or modification work; also that the SAS is not used for 
billing and no general purpose PCs are allowed at bay level. 
Message modification 
In this attack parts of a valid, existing message are modified in transit. Detection is 
facilitated through encryption and digital signatures, with the receiver having a record of all 
authorized senders. 
Message injection and replay 
The attacker sends messages which are not intended to be sent by any authorized sender. 
These may be entirely new messages from the attacker or original untampered with 
replayed messages. Digital signatures are a way of combating message injection. To mitigate 
against replay, a digital signature and message sequence number are required. 
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Fig. 20. Example of attack graph for a circuit breaker 
Message suppression 
In this attack certain messages between SAS devices are prevented from reaching the 
receiver, e.g., circuit breaker control devices are isolated from protection devices. Message 
suppression can involve several other types of attack, e.g., re-configuration of routers or 
switches, cutting wires or congesting the network so that genuine messages cannot get 
through (denial of service attack). 
Security protocols 
The multiplicity and varied nature of SAS attacks makes it imperative to institute robust 
security protocols capable of handling all eventualities. Such protocols include the use of 
private keys (only known to the sender), encryption and sequence numbers (initial number 
known between sender and receiver at the start). 
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12. Effects on educational curricula 
To give an idea of the profound changes the power system will have on our education 
systems and also to give some suggestions on how to mitigate some of the challenges, we 
reproduce the following excerpts from a paper by Chikuni, Engelbrecht and Dongo [17] at 
the PowerCon 2010 conference: 
“When we analyse a modern substation incorporating the new substation technology based 
on IEC 61850, it would seem that the role of an electrical engineer is notable by its absence. 
Certainly some of the responsibilities of both engineers and technicians have shifted and 
there needs to be new breed of electrical engineers altogether. Some questions need to be 
answered: 
 Should we retrain the power engineer in networks or 
 Should we train network engineers so that they acquire power engineering knowledge 
or 
 Should we work with a completely new curriculum which merges power systems, 
electronics and networks into one programme? 
We first need to acknowledge that there are already a lot of good power engineers out there 
trained in the traditional manner, i.e., starting off with physics, circuits and systems, 
electrical machines and power systems (including electrical protection). For these engineers, 
one needs to identify those who can benefit both themselves and their organizations by 
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going through this additional training. The process of training engineers has been quite 
formal, especially if they wish to attain professional status. One typically needs four to five 
years of formal training and a further two years of guided industrial training before 
attaining the status of chartered (CEng) or professional (PrEng) engineer. A great debate 
will ensue, therefore, when a computer network engineer is designated the ‘responsible 
person’ in an electrical substation, notwithstanding the obviously immense power this 
individual will have in making sure that the substation operates correctly, safely and 
efficiently. 
The other route is to include networking as part of any electrical engineering curriculum. A 
few programmes today include industrial automation and a few even include computer 
networking. In the University of Zimbabwe model all electrical engineering students have a 
chance to complete at least the first semesters of a CISCO network academy programme. 
Indeed some complete the CCNA (four semesters). Whatever solution is arrived at, it is clear 
that electrical engineering training curricula inevitably have to include more and more 
electronics, sensors, automation and networking, not as peripheral subjects, but as part of 
the core. 
13. Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we have seen the extremely rapid development of automation, starting from 
the years of mechanisation, production lines and the taking root of computer-based 
automation in the car manufacturing industry. Then we noticed rapid increases in computer 
power in both hardware and software forms. There has also been tremendous moves in 
standardization in North America and Europe. We have seen too IEC 61850 international 
cooperation in standards development and the benefits that are already being reaped from 
this. Interoperability brings some relief to customers, giving them the ability to choose 
hardware from an increasing variety of vendors. Quite striking is the increasing dominance 
of ICT in power system control and massive changes in power system operation and 
practice. The power systems have become more complex - more interlinked. The complexity 
presents new challenges. The traditionally trained power systems engineer lacks the know 
how to understand or tackle faults that could arise in these systems. On the other hand the 
network engineer may lack the underlying principles of power and energy systems. A new 
type of multi-discipline power systems engineer has to be trained. The Smart Grid will soon 
be a reality. Generation, transmission, distribution consumption and commerce will be 
information driven. Finally, when automation is combined with mechatronics and robotics, 
our lives are poised to be drastically changed. 
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